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Broadening Diversification To Include Skill

Broadening Diversification To Include Skill

Smart Thinking: A Skill Versus Luck Essay Series | Issue 3

Written by Michael A. Ervolini

Broadening Diversification To Include Skill

INTRODUCTION

Few investors, if there are any, doubt the benefits of diversification. Deciding precisely how to achieve it, however, remains a thorny challenge.

SEEKING DIVERSIFICATION

The practice of diversification (AKA risk management) gained considerable analytic rigor with the 1952 paper “Portfolio Selection “by Harry Markowitz. (1) In his paper Markowitz informs us that a portfolio’s riskiness is not simply the average risk of the assets or funds it owns. Instead, portfolio level risk is based upon the degree to which the prices of the various assets and funds move together. Said differently, do portfolio assets and funds provide offsetting or compounding riskiness? Assets and funds with positively correlated price movements tend to exacerbate risk while those whose price movements are uncorrelated or negatively correlated ameliorate it. One of Markowitz’s enduring contributions is showing that many sources of risk can be analytically identified, quantified and, therefore, managed.

Diversification and risk analytics have been greatly expanded since the 1950s. Within equities alone this includes the analysis of asset price movements in relationship to company location (country, global region) and relative to a host of factor exposures, such as market value (size), financial dynamics (growth vs. value), price momentum, balance sheet quality (debt levels), and earnings growth. These and similar characteristics are commonly integrated into portfolio construction processes. The intended result is a portfolio whose assets are sufficiently diverse such that the net effect provides an attractive trade-off between quantifiable risks and hoped for returns.

The diversification benefits from many traditional factors are in decline according to numerous studies. (2) This may be due to the effects of globalization and/or other market forces. What’s clear is that more positive correlations are now being observed among a number of traditional diversification characteristics. This dynamic, in good part, motivates the continued search for newer and alternative sources of incremental diversification.

THE HUMAN FACTOR

One idea that is gaining traction involves expanding the sources of diversification to include fund manager skill. While this may seem obvious implementing it has become possible only recently due to newer analytics. Traditional efforts to capture elements of manager skill have relied upon conventional analytics such as relative return, multi-factor alpha, attribution, upside/downside capture, information ratio, and active share. These metrics are very helpful in describing how an equity fund has performed. They say little about manager skill, however. Their shortcoming with regard to describing skill is inherent in the data they use. These data consist of two forms of outcome, namely fund returns and/or daily holdings. The outcome-driven results they produce can only hint at the presence or absence of skill. These analytics cannot identify nor quantify skill directly.

Fortunately, newer analytics for computing skill now exist. These newer analytics use as inputs the decisions made by the fund manager. These newer methods are referred to as decision-based analytics. These newer analytics relate the decisions made by the manager with the returns they generate. They connect cause and effect. This is precisely how skill is computed in other demanding endeavors like sports, auto racing, jet piloting, and surgery. These newer analytics provide capital owners and allocators enhanced insights into manager skills, decision consistency, and heretofore undetectable sources of risk. (3) Examples of how these newer analytics are helping asset owners and allocators are discussed next.

BETTER INSIGHTS, BETTER DECISIONS

Incremental diversification can be captured through the use of manager skills. Importantly, it is accessible even from funds whose managers are pursuing the same style and strategy. This opportunity exists when the stocks they purchase reflect different alpha time horizons or alpha generating profiles. (4) One manager might buy stocks that typically take off soon after initial purchase and continue to generate excess returns for 9 to 18 months (relatively fast and short time horizon). A second manager with the same mandate might be purchasing stocks that are slow to show any price movement but once they get going can generate alpha for two and three years or more (slow starters with extended time horizon. These two managers are fishing in essentially the same pond for the same species. Yet the fish they land are quantifiably different.

Alpha time horizon and other manager skills are now being used by JANA Investment Advisers, a manager search and OCIO consultancy. According to Justin Tay, JANA’s Head Of Global Equity Research: “Knowledge of a manager’s alpha time horizon can support allocations to multiple top managers even in the same style –while avoiding overlapping decision processes. It’s a subtle but important form of diversification.” (5) This type of diversification can improve the odds of capturing the full potential from each style/strategy blend by finding managers whose buy processes yield stocks that outperform over different time horizons. 

Another aspect of skill involves the management of significant losers, defined as positions down by 20% or more. Some managers are skilled at culling out significant losers unlikely to recover and/or retaining those that eventually do rebound. The opposite also is observed where managers are too quick to sell depressed stocks which soon rebound and/or have trouble letting go of weak positions that never recover. Knowing how effectively managers (even great ones) deal with significant losers provides additional insights into how risky a fund may become in a market downturn.

Then there is the question of position sizing. Deploying meaningful capital into stocks before or as soon as they begin to take off enables funds to capture the full benefit of strong buys. In contrast, habitually under sizing or chasing strong buys undermines the potential available from purchases that outperform. Knowing how effectively a manager builds up their best buys (winners) can shed light on the likelihood of capturing excess returns going forward.

These and other newer analytic results are enabling asset owners and allocators to better assess equity managers and strengthen their allocation processes.

IT’S CATCHING ON

Increasingly investors are integrating the newer analytics into their equity allocation processes. Pension funds and sovereign wealth funds are using the newer analytics to both assess external allocations and to obtain clearer insight into how effectively internal teams are managing their equity funds. Endowments, Family offices, and large asset management companies are using the newer analytics to better understand the strengths and shortcomings of their third-party equity managers. The results include a deeper understanding of which skills are driving results and which skill deficits may represent previously unknown risks. The insights obtained also support more productive discussions between investors and fund managers – during due diligence, at regular update meetings, and especially when fund results are disappointing.

CONCLUSION

Portfolio diversification is a common objective. Globalization and other market forces are increasing the correlation among various diversification characteristics (e.g., funds, asset types, factors). Stronger positive correlations make diversification ever more difficult. 

In response asset owners and allocators are expanding how they view and implement their approaches to diversification. One transformative effort underway is the integration of manager skills as an additional alpha and risk characteristic. Doing this requires use of newer decision-based analytics. These newer analytics provide superior measures of manager skill by relating decisions taken by a manager to the impact such decisions have on fund results.  

It’s time. Time to improve the industry’s knowledge about manager skill. Time to capture more effectively the potential available from actively managed equities. Time to make better equity allocation decisions.

ENDNOTES

  1. Harry Markowitz, “Portfolio Selection,” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Mar. 1952), pp.77-91.
  2. For example, see: Richard Yasenchak, “Correlation Conundrum: How Will You Fix Portfolio Diversification?,” Intech Investment, Inc., March 8, 2023. https://www.intechinvestments.com
  3. Michael A. Ervolini, “Skill Versus Luck – Taking The Guesswork Out Of Equity Fund Selection,” MIT Press, February 3, 2026. Available for pre-order on Amazon.
  4. A fund’s alpha generating profile or information advantage indicates, on average: when new stock purchases begin to outperform, how much excess return they generate, and when outperformance tends to be depleted.
  5. Interview by the author with Justin Tay, Head Of Global Equity Research, JANA Investment Advisors, Inc., June 2025.
Michael Ervolini headshot

MICHAEL A. ERVOLINI, AUTHOR

The ideas expressed on this website are developed and/or curated by Michael Ervolini. Mike has spent his entire 35 year + career leading efforts to improve and strengthen active management.

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Essays

Making Active Equities More Stylish

Making Active Equities Mo

Smart Thinking: A Skill Versus Luck Essay Series | Issue 2

Written by Michael A. Ervolini

Making Action Equities More Stylish

INTRODUCTION

Style analysis is used regularly to support equity fund assessment and allocation decisions. While this analytic offers useful insights, its value in determining a fund’s desirability may be more limited than generally perceived. It can deliver unintended consequences that diminish rather than enhance ultimate outcomes. This essay clarifies the benefits available from style analysis and offers an improved approach for its use in supporting active equity fund assessment.

GOT STYLE?

In his landmark 1988 paper “Determining a fund’s effective asset mix”, William F. Sharpe described a method for assessing the style characteristics of an equity fund.*1 Since then style analysis has become an integral element of fund assessment, allocation decisions, and confirmation that a fund is acting in accordance with its strategy and purpose (i.e., identifying style drift).*2

The debate continues regarding whether Sharpe’s return-based analysis or the alternate holdings-based method yield the more creditable result.*3  The returns-based approach resolves which asset indices best explain (i.e., are most correlated) with the return series of a fund or portfolio. Return-based style analysis is commonly referred to as a top-down approach. Holdings-based analysis takes a more bottom-up path by first determining the style or factor characteristics of each of a fund’s holdings over time. For example, some holdings may be more growth oriented while others more value oriented. Factor levels are then aggregated across holdings to formulate the fund’s overall style.

WHAT YOU GET

Both approaches have their strengths and shortcomings. But each serves a basic role in fund assessment. In the words of Sharpe: “All that style is is exposure. If I say your style is 60% growth and 40% value that means you’ll move 0.6 times whatever happens to growth stocks plus 0.4 times whatever happens to value stocks.”*4

The algebra cited by Sharpe holds to the extent that the fund continues to be managed in the future much the way it was managed in the past. Meaning that the fund owns an array of stocks such that the returns going forward, or the factor composition of its holdings are based on similar bets as were previously taken (i.e., exposures to large/small caps, growth/value, interest rates). 

A diversified fund that is highly consistent in the stocks it owns fits this bill. So does a diversified fund that rotates from one factor to another regularly. Style analysis can be less helpful for a highly concentrated fund. Here a couple of positions can dominate the fund’s factor exposures. And the dominant positions can change in response to market forces rather than manager intention. This can result in substantial style shifts that may be of limited value in estimating future exposures. A similar diminution in usefulness of style analysis is encountered for a fund that has recently and permanently changed its strategy or alpha sourcing. Although it is important to be mindful of these two latter considerations the bigger issue is the frequent misapplication of style analysis and the unintended consequences therefrom.

THE STYLE TRAP

What can style analysis say about effective fund management? In good part it depends on the question being investigated. One common use of style analysis is the assessment of style drift. Drift is indicated by a set of current factor exposures that differ meaningfully from the fund’s historic exposures (i.e., the style changed). Typically, the desired outcome is the absence of style drift or, stated in the affirmative, consistent factor exposures. However, exposure consistency frequently comes at a high cost.

Consider a value fund. It is fully expected that this fund is purchasing mostly (if not exclusively) stocks with a clear value signature. Which means that at time of initial purchase these stocks fit the value style. But what about new buys that then go on to generate significant excess returns? As these positions experience improving fundamentals and upward price movement, they begin to shed their value characteristics and edge into growth territory. One assumes that this evolution is a primary reason for buying value stocks in the first place. The intention being that enough of these value stocks will outperform sufficiently so that the fund itself can generate excess returns.

All too often, however, value funds significantly trim or liquidate their strongest performing positions prematurely. These actions are taken well before such successful buys have exhausted their ability to generate excess returns. It’s done to ensure that the fund is not perceived as drifting outside of its value style box. Managers that engage in such activities believe it is what clients want. They are often told that: “The client is allocated to the fund based, in good part, on its style or factor exposures. Departures from historical style are likely to complicate (or even compromise) the client’s overall risk management.” In Such situations adherence to style or overall factor exposures supersedes the capture of excess returns. Clearly, managing risk indirectly through style allocations brings with it unintended consequences.

GOING STYLISH

There is an alternate and for many better ways of confronting the question of style. It involves selecting funds based on the types of stocks they purchase rather than all the stocks they own.*5 Within this formulation value funds are expected to purchase value stocks, growth funds are expected to purchase growth stocks, and so forth. Once a position is established, however, the fund is then expected to maximize its contribution to excess returns subject to prespecified levels of risk control. This enables value fund to own growthy stocks that were initially purchase when they were clearly value. It allows a small cap fund to own mid cap stocks that have performed well and grown out of their small cap designation. It improves the potential for funds to realize excess returns while purchasing stocks that fit a specific style designation.

Allocating to funds that operate as described requires some rethinking and retooling on the part of asset owners/allocators. In particular they need to take a greater role in managing the overall risk exposures across their equity platforms. By analyzing the complete set of all their equity positions (internally and externally managed) they are able to offset over and under exposures more comprehensively. And in doing so they give a greater degree of freedom to each manager that can be used in the pursuit of excess returns.

CONCLUSION

Actively managed equities continue to be an important asset class for many investors. Institutional asset owners/allocators can increase the value available from this asset class today by focusing style analysis directly on the types of stocks being purchased rather than on conformity of fund overall exposures.  This will allow funds to hold on to their strongest positions longer and capture even greater excess returns. Replacing traditional style conformity and using a “purchase what is expected” approach is already helping a growing number of asset owners/allocators improve the results from their equity programs. These investors are capturing greater excess returns while making equity investing ever more stylish.

ENDNOTES

  1. William F. Sharpe, “Determining a fund’s effective asset mix,” Investment management review, 1988.
  2. “RETURNS – VS. HOLDINGS – BASED STYLE ANALYSIS”, Beacon Pointe Research White Paper, Beacon Pointe Advisors, LLC, September 2022.
  3. Paul D. Kaplan, “Holdings-Based And Returns-Based Style Models”, MorningStar, Inc. June 2023.
  4. Barry Vinocur, “Setting The Record Straight On Style Analysis”, A Newsmaker Interview, Stanford University, 1999, http://www-sharpe.stanford.edu/fa.
  5. Michael A. Ervolini, “Skill Versus Luck – Taking The Guesswork Out of Equity Fund Selection”, MIT Press, February 2026 (forthcoming).
Michael Ervolini headshot

MICHAEL A. ERVOLINI, AUTHOR

The ideas expressed on this website are developed and/or curated by Michael Ervolini. Mike has spent his entire 35 year + career leading efforts to improve and strengthen active management.

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Measuring Manager Skill Versus Fund Outcomes

Measuring Manager Skill Versus Fund Outcomes

Smart Thinking: A Skill Versus Luck Essay Series | Issue 1

Written by Michael A. Ervolini

Measuring Skilled Managers Versus Fund Outcomes

Active equity investors want their capital in the hands of skilled managers.

The reasoning is straightforward: Managers with the greatest levels of skill should do better than their less skilled peers over time, all other things being equal. Identifying who is highly skilled and who is less so, however, remains a difficult if not utterly impossible task for most investors. And make no mistake about it, this problem is equally vexing to large and highly sophisticated asset owners as well as individuals.  The inability to effectively assess skill lies in the analytics commonly used for such investigations. Such conventional analytics provide useful information for sure – just not about skills.

What’s meant by conventional analytics is the myriad of metrics regularly used in support of fund assessments. These analytics include relative return, multi-factor alpha, information ratio, upside/downside capture, active share, attribution, hit rates, batting average, and slugging ratio. These metrics are effective in describing how a fund generated its returns. They indicate whether the fund’s returns were the result of high concentration, market factor cyclicality, wisely overweighting or underweighting sectors, or taking on additional risk (i.e., volatility). What these analytics cannot do is identify or quantify skill.

The reason is elemental. Conventional analytics are computed using a fund’s return series and/or its holdings history as their data. These data are themselves outcomes. They reflect the performance of the fund which constitutes its returns and also substantially determines the size of its holdings over time. These conventionally derived metrics, therefore, are referred to as outcome-based analytics. And while outcomes do reflect the presence or absence of skill they are not themselves measures of skill.

Meaningful measures of skill are found in the relationships between types of manager decisions and the results they generate. Said differently, skill measurement involves capturing cause and effect. A golfer’s skill is not measured by how many games they win. It is assessed by the distance and placement of drives off the tea, the ability to hit shots with irons close to or onto the green, and the accuracy of the putting. As each of these skills improve we’d expect the golfer to achieve stronger results (i.e., win more games).

As mentioned, manager skills are observed by investigating specific decisions or actions taken and the results they generate. Examples of manager skills that can be isolated and calculated include:

  • Buying new stocks that more often than not outperform their sectors or benchmarks.
  • Selling positions such that the alpha from strong stocks is captured while the drag from underperforming stocks is minimized. 
  • Sizing positions so that sufficient capital is invested in the strongest stocks (i.e., allowing them to lift overall fund returns).

Metrics such as these reflect what are known as decision-based analytics. These analytics capture the cause and effect relationships between manager actions and fund returns. They provide unambiguous measures of skill. Using the results of decision-based analytics enables investors to more effectively assess a fund’s desirability and to make better allocation decisions.

Currently there are a number of firms which provide decision-based analytics.The question that the industry needs to address is why aren’t these superior measures of skill being used regularly today? Absent such analytics investors simply cannot make their best decisions, which can lead only to bad outcomes for all market participants.

ENDNOTES

  1. Firms providing decision-based analytics include: Inalytics, LTD, FactSet Research Systems, Inc., Alpha Theory LLC, Essentia Analytics LTD, and Behavioral Lab LTD.
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MICHAEL A. ERVOLINI, AUTHOR

The ideas expressed on this website are developed and/or curated by Michael Ervolini. Mike has spent his entire 35 year + career leading efforts to improve and strengthen active management.

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Motivated Reasoning

Behavioral Matters: Insights from the application of Behavioral Finance | Issue 11

Written by Michael A. Ervolini

Motivated Reasoning

“Whenever a new observation or thought came across me, which was opposed to my general results, [I tried] to make a memorandum of it without fail and at once; for I had found by experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to escape from the memory than favorable ones.”

– Charles Darwin

INTRODUCTION

Confronting our own mistakes in judgment is painful. It is one reason we rationalize. Rationalization can, however, alter our interpretation of facts and lead to ineffective decisions. Rationalization is one of the powerful unconscious forces that can drive you towards behavioral investing. In this essay we discuss rationalization, motivated reasoning and five simple ideas for greater self-awareness.

WISHFUL THINKING

Rationalization is something we all do. Call it wishful thinking. By either name, it’s the tendency people have to fit perceptions of reality into a mold that is heavily influenced by preferences. Most of us are highly selective in the information we choose to process and how we process it, for emotional rather than analytic reasons.

When it comes to equity investing, wishful thinking can be devastating. It can blind us to undesirable facts without which we are likely to make ineffective decisions. Rationalizing causes us to depend on confirming information and minimize the significance of conflicting information. Since rationalizations come about comfortably and naturally, they often hide from our conscious ability to detect them, let alone manage them.

MOTIVATION MATTERS

One model for understanding how and why we rationalize, called Motivated Reasoning, suggests that the brain works to satisfy two distinct functions simultaneously – analytic thinking and emotional thinking. While analytic thinking strives to achieve the best fit for the data at hand (accuracy), emotional thinking wants to reinforce existing beliefs and diminish conflicting data (directional).

Those directional goals reflect our beliefs, biases and desires. Interplay between accuracy and directional goals can result in radically different reasoning given the same information at different times. Or as Professor Ziva Kunda puts it: “People rely on cognitive processes and representations to arrive at their desired conclusions, but motivation plays a role in determining which of these will be used on a given occasion.”

NOBODY’S FOOL

Rationalization is often misconstrued as an intentional effort to fool ourselves. To the contrary, we are often very sincere in our assessment of our reasons, while rationalizing. Consider the commonly observed behavior from Prospect Theory involving “risk seeking with losses.” A new position is down by 30% a short time after purchase. The manager decides to buy more believing that it is at a bargain price and sure to bounce. Objectively this may represent a shrewd capitalization on an over-beaten stock. On the other hand, it might be another case of taking even greater risks in the hope of ultimately breaking even.

The interaction between facts and unconscious desires is explained by Professor Kunda this way: “People do not seem to be at liberty to conclude whatever they want to conclude merely because they want to. They draw the desired conclusion only if they can muster up the evidence necessary to support it.“

A contributing factor is that we have a strong need to explain why we make our decisions and actions to ourselves and to others. In explaining our reasoning, motivations for self-efficacy and respect, result in our formulating a narrative. The narrative lays out all the facts as a reasonable and compelling story. Our need to feel good about ourselves and be respected by others, however, fills in around the facts until the narrative morphs into more of a fable than an accounting of what transpired.

RATIONALIZING BEHAVIOR

Rationalization underpins many well known behavioral tendencies: Self Attribution, Anchoring, Hindsight Bias, Optimism Bias and overconfidence, to name a few.

Motivated Reasoning can result in our need for a certain conclusion that then shapes how facts are interpreted. The need to explain can lead to narratives that deliver the wrong lessons to our memories. This, in turn, can result in heuristics, beliefs and biases that push us repeatedly and predictably towards ineffective decisions. Or as Artimus Ward once said: “It ain’t so much the things you don’t know that get you in trouble. It’s the things you know that just ain’t so.”

CONCLUSION

Rationalization reflects an internal struggle between interpreting facts and wanting an outcome that coincides with a belief or desire. As a result, the brain converges on a solution that incorporates available information while minimizing negative and maximizing positive feelings.

Rationalization positions us to readily accept facts that support our desire or belief while urging us to hold unfamiliar or unpleasant facts to a higher standard. Unconscious filtering results in a narrative that passes both our conscious scrutiny and that of others whose respect is desired. Ironically, scrutinization of why decisions were made or actions taken actually gives the illusion of being objective. To make matters even more difficult, the more intelligent the person is the better they will be at constructing and presenting a believable narrative.

Tough-minded investment management requires strong doses of introspection. To help in implementing your heightened self-awareness here are five reminders to pin up on your office wall:

  1. The brain tries to see relationships or stories, even when there are none.
  2. The brain forgets and remembers what it wants, in a very biased way.
  3. Narratives, even the most earnest of them, reflect Motivated Reasoning.
  4. Actively search for data that was overlooked or contradicts my theories or beliefs.
  5. How would someone who disagrees with me look at this data?

ENDNOTES

  1. “The Case for Motivated Reasoning”, Psychological Bulletin, the American Psychological Association, November 1990 Vol. 108, No. 3, by Ziva Kunda.
  2. Perspectives on Self-Deception, by Brian P. McLaughlin and Amélie Oksenberg, University of California Press, 1988.
  3. How We Know What Isn’t So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life, by Thomas Gilovich, Simon & Schuster, 1993.
  4. Don’t Believe Everything You Think: The 6 Basic Mistakes We Make in Thinking, by Thomas E. Kida, Prometheus Books 2006.

MICHAEL A. ERVOLINI, AUTHOR

The ideas expressed on this website are developed and/or curated by Michael Ervolini. Mike has spent his entire 35 year + career leading efforts to improve and strengthen active management.

Categories
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Beware Phantastic Investments

Behavioral Matters: Insights from the application of Behavioral Finance | Issue 17

Written by Michael A. Ervolini

Beware Phantastic Investments

“A good story is more compelling than the search for the truth.”

– Shakespeare, Richard III

INTRODUCTION

By its very nature, investing requires making estimates about future events. These estimates reflect the manager’s analysis of facts combined with imagining likely but unsure outcomes. Imagination is what enables skilled investors to see opportunities ahead of the crowd. It can also excite emotions that make it difficult to distinguish real investment opportunities from “phantastic” ones.

EMOTIONAL INVESTING

The theory of Emotional Finance examines investor tendencies through the lens of Freudian psychoanalysis. Sigmund Freud suggested that thoughts cause people to experience two basic types of feelings, pleasurable or painful. Pleasurable feelings, understandably, are sought out and painful ones are avoided or repressed. According to Freud, the seeking and avoiding all occurs within the unconscious. In addition, he proposed that the mind often holds conflicting emotions about a person, idea or thing simultaneously… like/dislike, love/hate and trust/distrust being common conflicts. Because these conflicting feelings are both strong and unknown to the conscious mind, they affect our beliefs about our relationships with the world. This means investing involves entering into an emotional and unconscious relationship with the assets you own.

Research team Richard Taffler, a professor of finance and investment and David Tuckett, a professor of psychoanalysis, who together developed the theory of Emotional Finance, extend these Freudian concepts into investing. According to Professor Taffler, “People are prone to unrecognized emotions — fears and fantasies — which Freud described as the main components of unconscious mental life and the deep drivers of human judgment.” These unrecognized emotions are often more powerful than either facts or the results of objective analysis, driving investors to oscillate between feelings of hope and fear about their investments.

Taffler and Tuckett are quick to acknowledge the vital contributions that Behavioral Finance has made to the understanding of decision-making under uncertainty. Their concern with the direction of current Behavioral Finance inquiry, however, is that it often tends to focus on the cognitive underpinnings of ineffective judgmental tendencies alone. They argue that cognition and emotion need to be studied together to truly understand investor behavior.

SEPARATING FACT FROM FANTASY

Formulating judgments about, and acting on, information before it is fully priced into the market is how managers add value to investing. Typically, they identify promising candidates (either purely bottom-up or supported with systematic screening) and then choose specific names to own. Ultimately, purchasing an asset requires a commitment — capital, ongoing attention and choosing when to liquidate.

Taffler and Tuckett see the ownership commitment as forming an important emotional relationship with the asset — one that can bring happiness or let you down. They suggest, “When we commit to an investment strategy, we commit to an imagined relationship with consequences — a relationship not unlike a marriage contract.” They go on to say, “Psychoanalysts postulate three principal kinds of imagined emotional relationships, governed by: L (loving), H (hating), and K or -K (knowing or anti-knowing).”

Objective decision-making requires “knowing” the asset — being aware of its potential to please and disappoint and accepting both as a balanced reason for owning it — an integrated view. This reflects the type of unemotional objectivity that is associated with disciplined investing. It grounds manager decisions so that winners are sold as their thesis is achieved and losers are reevaluated and then sold or kept based on their go-forward potential.

Conversely, “anti-knowing” involves splitting potential pain from pleasure. For buys, this amounts to avoiding the unpleasant feelings related to the risk of loss while focusing on the potential pleasure from a gain. This form of relationship makes assets overly attractive while they are performing and then horribly disappointing when their momentum turns. Such abrupt and full throttle reversals between “loving and hating” causes overbuying and overselling as investors gather up pleasure and disgorge pain.

EMOTIONAL NARRATIVES

Assets commonly are chosen because they represent a strong thesis. The thesis is a simple narrative description of all the facts known about the asset plus a judgment of why these facts indicate likely out-performance. Formulating the thesis involves assessing potential risks as well as returns. A fundamental aspect of this process requires managers to contemplate future events whose outcomes are highly uncertain. Contemplating the unknowable produces anxiety for managers, thereby, injecting emotional content into their analyses. These anxieties push buttons within the manager’s unconscious, having the effect of short-circuiting their otherwise disciplined approach to decision-making.

There are two types of anxiety produced by investing, according to Taffler and Tuckett: “… that caused by unavoidable information asymmetries at the moment of decision-making, and that determined by the fact the future is inherently unknowable.” Information asymmetry undermines conviction, niggling away at the manager’s resolve or as the researchers suggest “This judgment creates anxiety. First, there is the fear that the information they have been given by the firm’s management is untrustworthy, second there is the fear that even if the information and their underlying analysis is correct, the rest of the market may never come to share their view.”

While the manager’s unconscious is battling information asymmetry, it is also being harassed by uncertainty about the future. Imagining tomorrow’s outcomes is one thing; betting that they will materialize is quite another. Together, these two sources of uncertainty create anxiety that, as mentioned, is often dealt with by splitting the good feelings (upside) from the bad (downside) — a defense mechanism that calms emotional stress and bolsters conviction while increasing portfolio risk. Although your current processes can guide imagination toward a potentially unique idea, they may offer no protection from the anxieties generated throughout the analysis and ownership of the asset.

YOUR PHANTASTIC!

It always pays to be mindful that an asset is a probabilistic mix of risk and return, with the potential to deliver both pain and pleasure. This integrated perspective can enable investors to manage a thesis more effectively — objectively knowing when to hold their conviction and when to change. When assets are held for reasons rooted more in emotion than reasoned expectation, the unconscious has more control over investment decisions. As positions migrate from gain to loss and back again, these shifts in performance trigger emotions that invoke thoughts about your relationship with the asset, and these thoughts foster further emotions, and so on. The cycle repeats until the unconscious has you cornered — you either love or hate the investment.

When your over excited the tendency is to act emotionally, often running roughshod over any remnants of analytic thinking. This behavior relates to what Taffler and Tuckett have termed a “phantastic object”. The term phantastic object they describe: “… is derived from two ideas. The Freudian concept of object denotes a mental representation, i.e. a symbol of something in our mind but not the actual thing itself. Phantasy is a technical term which psychoanalysts use to describe an individual’s unconscious beliefs and wishes which come from the earliest stages of an infant’s mental development. Thus a phantastic object is a mental representation of something (or someone, or an idea) which fulfills the individual’s deepest desires to have exactly what they want and exactly when they want it.” Relating this to investing, the phantastic object is initially seen as possessing superior qualities, well above the usual investment opportunity, allowing the manager to achieve his emotional goal of delivering exceptional returns with no downside risk.  In other words, this opportunity is simply phantastic. But because this impression of the asset is created in part by suppressing thoughts and feelings about its limitations and risks, or what Tuckett and Taffler describe as splitting, its inevitable disappointment gives credence to the lingering doubts stored in the unconscious. What once was loved becomes hated and a hold quickly turns into a sell.

EMOTIONAL FACTOR

In their CFA Monagraph to be published later this year, the research team discusses findings from in-depth interviews conducted by Professor Tuckett with over 50 fund managers from around the globe. One of the many insights from these interviews is the nature of risk, specifically risk felt by managers. When talking about their greatest exposures this group of managers tended to discuss information risk, the future being unpredictable, business risk and career risk. As Professor Taffler explains, “These are very different to conventional measures of risk. Yet these are the real risks managers worry about. So the concept of risk also has a key emotional dimension.”

Taffler and Tuckett see conventional risk models as providing pseudo-defenses against uncertainty. They suggest that the practice of performing regressions against historical relationships can lull individuals in to believing that they know more about the future than is possible. This overoptimism about the future or, conversely, overconfidence about the ability to control uncertainty fascilitates managers in splitting — enabling them to focus on potential gains since the risks feel like they have already been managed. This interpretation of unconscious processing is consistent with Kahneman and Lovallo who found that the mere investigation of uncertainty can lead to an illusion of control and under-appreciation of actual risk. One likely example of this behavior is when managers override portfolio optimizers to retain or pump up the size of favorite positions. These decisions to “go against the science” of the risk models are commonly defended as the manager having a strong intuition about an asset: An alternative explanation is that she is reaching for a phantastic object.

CONCLUSION

Reasoning involves telling stories to yourself. The more objective the stories, the more sound each thesis and investment decision. Thesis formulation relies on making judgments about events whose outcomes are inherently uncertain. These judgments produce anxiety that often has an adverse impact on the assessment of risks as assets are being evaluated.

The new theory of Emotional Finance examines how the unconscious management of anxiety affects investment decisions. It offers additional insights into how unconscious motivations easily erupt into buy and sell decisions. The brain is terribly adept at substituting emotions for facts in order to make a financial decision that feels right. This unconscious means of decision-making represents a constant counterforce to your intended discipline and process. Heightened self-awareness is one way to combat the unconscious forces that drive unintended decisions. You just can’t build fantastic performance owning phantastic objects.

REFERENCES

  1. Richard J. Taffler,., Martin Currie Professor of Finance and Investment, University of Edinburgh. Exclusive interview with Cabot Research, December 23, 2009.
  2. Richard J. Taffler,. and David A. Tuckett, “Emotional Finance: The Role of the Unconscious in Financial Decisions.” Chapter 5 in Behavioral Finance (eds. Kent Baker and John Nofsinger), Wiley 2010.
  3. David Tuckett, “Addressing the Psychology of Financial Markets.” Economics, The Open-Access, Open Assessment E-Journal, vol. 3, 2009-40.
  4. Richard J. Taffler and David Tuckett, “How a State of Mind Abets Market Instability.” The Financial Times, September 21, 2007.
  5. Richard J. Taffler and David Tuckett, “Emotional Finance: Understanding What Drives Investors.” Professional Investor, Autumn, 2007, pp. 18-20.
  6. Daniel Kahneman and Dan Lovallo, “Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking”, Management Science, vol. 39, no. 1, January 1993, pp. 17-31.

ADDITIONAL READING

  1. David Tucket and Richard Taffler, “Phantastic Objects and the Financial Market’s Sense of Reality: A Psychoanalytic Contribution to the Understanding of Stock Market Instability.” International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol. 89, no. 2, 2008, pp. 389-412.
  2. Arman Eshraghi and Richard Taffler, “Hedge Funds and Unconscious Fantasy.” University of Edinburgh Business School Working Paper, November 26, 2009. Available electronically at: http//ssrn.com/abstract=1522486.

MICHAEL A. ERVOLINI, AUTHOR

The ideas expressed on this website are developed and/or curated by Michael Ervolini. Mike has spent his entire 35 year + career leading efforts to improve and strengthen active management.

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Articles

When Buying Low And Selling High Destroy Alpha

Article Forthcoming in Journal of Investing | May 2024

Written by Michael A. Ervolini and Andrew R. Tuttle

When Buying Low and Selling High Destroy Alpha: Visualizing The Interplay Amongst Judgment, Process, and Prospect Theory

Article Abstract

Evidence of the disposition effect and its negative impacts on equity funds is well established. Many managers continue to sell winners too quickly and hold on to losers too long. Efforts to eliminate these and other behavioral tendencies appear to be limited in their impact. Weak feedback regarding which decisions are helping generate excess returns and which aren’t is a major stumbling block that inhibits such improvement efforts. So too is the resistance to change frequently present when change is unconsciously perceived as more risky than the status quo. This paper argues that the use of newer analytics, in particular the vivid visualizations of manager decisions with individual holdings, can greatly increase the odds that a manager will develop greater self-awareness and actually improve.

Three Key Takeaways:

1.

Confirmation of behavioral tendencies such as the disposition effect have existed for decades. Yet, there is scant evidence that knowledge of these tendencies has impacted equity manager decisions or fund results.

2.

Looming largest amongst the reasons many managers have trouble eliminating behavioral tendencies and improving generally are: the lack of rigorous feedback about which decisions add alpha and which destroy it, and succumbing to emotional needs that are in conflict with learning. 

3.

Visualizations reflecting each action taken by a manager on individual holdings, in conjunction with rigorous and granular fund-level analytics, can enable managers to overcome unproductive behavioral tendencies.

MICHAEL A. ERVOLINI, AUTHOR

The ideas expressed on this website are developed and/or curated by Michael Ervolini. Mike has spent his entire 35+ year career leading efforts to improve and strengthen active management.

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WHEN BUYING LOW AND SELLING HIGH DESTROY ALPHA

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WEAK FEEDBACK AND DENIAL ARE KILLING ACTIVE MANAGEMENT

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Essays

Inside-Out Investing

Behavioral Matters: Insights from the application of Behavioral Finance | Issue 16

Written by Michael A. Ervolini

Inside-Out Investing

“It is the optimistic denial of uncontrollable uncertainty that accounts for managers’ views of themselves as prudent risk takers, and for their rejection of gambling as a model of what they do.”

– Daniel Kahneman

INTRODUCTION

Analysis is fundamental to equity investing. Deep dives require that you apply extensive energy and talent into understanding a company and its ability to deliver excess returns. Yet this activity can awaken behavioral tendencies that short-circuit your analytic processes. Consequently, rigorous analysis can heighten the potential for over optimism at exactly the moment when greater objectivity is needed. This essay examines the importance of calibrating judgements as a critical element of self-awareness and honing investment skill.

THE DEEP DIVE

The greater the opportunity or risk associated with an outcome, the more analysis typically is applied to the decision. Investors commonly employ a process or framework to guide them through the steps of detailed company analysis. Such steps are analogous to what biologists, chemists, physicists and other refer to as the scientific method.

Presented with a challenging decision the problem is first reduced to its major components. These, in turn, are further deconstructed to smaller and smaller components facilitating clear understanding and confident resolution. After gathering and analyzing appropriate data for all subcomponents, the process is reversed and an understanding of the initial question is constructed by assembling your understanding of the components and their relationship to each other.

Done well, deep analysis can lead to rich proprietary insights about a company’s likely performance or intrinsic value. This is the “information advantage” that skilled professionals bring to portfolio management. Intense rigor can also produce over optimistic conclusions reflecting a run-away process.

MOTIVATION PLEASE

Thinking is more emotional than commonly believed. The cognitive process itself draws upon both the analytic and emotional parts of the brain. Reasoning is a blended outcome of the “best fit” for the data under consideration plus unconscious filtering and shaping of that data to support beliefs, biases or desires within the unconscious. This model of thinking, known as Motivated Reasoning, helps explain why even the most careful experts engage in over optimistic assessments when performing rigorous analyses.

Excessively optimistic forecasts of risky outcomes, according to Professor Kahneman, are linked to “…three main forms of a pervasive optimistic bias” (i) unrealistically positive self-evaluations, (ii) unrealistic optimism about future events and plans, and (iii) an illusion of control.” Rigorous analysis often ignites these unconscious motivations resulting in both narrow framing of the possible outcomes (extreme possibilities are discounted) and higher certainty or success being assigned to each subcomponent evaluated – as if by thoroughly analyzing a risk it has been rendered less risky.

Judgment is further affected when issues are viewed as unique. “The natural way to think about a problem is to bring to bear all one knows about it, with special attention to its unique feature,” says Professor Kahneman. This is precisely the dilemma of thesis management.

INSIDE-OUT

The deep dive reflects what Professor Kahneman terms the “inside view.” This is the view of a situation that is based on judgments applied to specific facts about that situation. Michael Mauboussin, author and Chief Investment Strategist for Legg Mason Capital Management offers a less flattering description: “Inside view are judgments about information gathered; they involve anecdotal evidence and fallacious perceptions.” Yet, inside views are the very cornerstone of the process used by analysts and managers to shape investment decisions.

One technique recommended by both Kahneman and Mauboussin for managing the perils of inside views is to balance them with “outside views.” Outside views are based entirely on facts. They ignore specific attributes of the situation under consideration. Instead, the outside view looks to typical outcomes for similar situations. It accomplishes this through the use of statistics compiled from a group of relevant comparable opportunities.

Consider a company analysis that requires forecasting the expected revenue stream from a drug currently in Phase 3 trials. Formulating such an outcome conventionally involves many steps including: estimating the chances that the trial will be successful, anticipating a likely efficacy for the new drug and then translating this information into estimates of market size, unit demand, cost and price. Each of these seemingly objective judgments will reflect selected experiences in your memory and the belief you have in management’s ability to think strategically and execute effectively — a classic inside view. Approaching the same task using an outside view would begin by identifying like companies that have attempted similar endeavors. Once identified, the results from this group of comparable situations would be analyzed to determine benchmarking information such as: percent success/fail, mean outcome when successful and the standard deviation across results.

Foregoing inside views is not realistic for most investors. Seeing assets that can generate excess returns is, by definition, hunting for uniqueness. Highly skilled investors, however are experts at isolating truly unique characteristics for any opportunity. Then they rigorously analyze these characteristics as appropriate, drawing upon outside view facts to sharpen judgments and spotlight key risks.

CONCLUSION

Rigorous analysis is, in large part, what professional investors rely upon to make buy and sell decisions. This can lead to over optimistic assessments reflecting the shortcomings of inside views. Outside views can be incorporated into the evaluation process, helping calibrate interim steps of your analysis. The take-away for refining your investing is this: inside views may be essential for identifying opportunities that are well reasoned while outside views keep your judgments reasonable.

ENDNOTES

  1. “Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking”, Daniel Kahneman and Dan Lovallo, Management Science, Vol. 38, No. 1, January 1993.
  2. Think Twice: Harnessing the Power of Counterintuition, Michael J. Mauboussin, Harvard Business Press, Fall 2009.
  3. “Motivated Reasoning”, A Behavioral Matters essay, Issue 11, April 15, 2009.

MICHAEL A. ERVOLINI, AUTHOR

The ideas expressed on this website are developed and/or curated by Michael Ervolini. Mike has spent his entire 35 year + career leading efforts to improve and strengthen active management.

RESOURCES

MOST POPULAR ESSAYS

JUDGMENT

THANKS FOR THE

MEMORIES

PROCESS

BEWARE PHANTASTIC INVESTMENTS

BEHAVIORS

INSIDE-OUT

INVESTING

WANT MORE WAYS TO IMPROVE YOUR SKILLS?

The multi-trillion dollar active management industry is predicated on the idea that managers have skill – yet little is known about it – Who has skill? How is it measured? This website is dedicated to finding answers to the questions surrounding skill.

CATEGORIES

JUDGMENT

PROCESS

BEHAVIORS


© COPYRIGHT 2024, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED